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Abstract. We address the question of whether price of stability results (existence
of equilibria with low social cost) are robust to incomplete information. We show
that this is the case in potential games, if the underlying algorithmic social cost
minimization problem admits a constant factor approximation algorithm via strict
cost-sharing schemes. Roughly, if the existence of an α-approximate equilibrium
in the complete information setting was proven via the potential method, then
there also exists a α · β-approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the incomplete
information setting, where β is the approximation factor of the strict-cost sharing
scheme algorithm. We apply our approach to Bayesian versions of the archetypal,
in the price of stability analysis, network design models and show the existence of
O(log(n))-approximate Bayes-Nash equilibria in several games whose complete
information counterparts have been well-studied, such as undirected network de-
sign games, multi-cast games and covering games.
1 Introduction
Quantifying the inefficiency caused by selfish user behavior in large engineered sys-
tems, such as communications networks, has been a central goal in the intersection of
computer science and game theory. A large amount of literature, starting from the early
works of [27] and [33], has analyzed the price of anarchy: the ratio of the social cost of
the worst selfish equilibrium outcome over the optimal social cost that a central planner
could implement. At the counterpart of this approach is the notion of the price of sta-
bility introduced in [3], which is a more optimistic inefficiency quantification, looking
at the best rather than worst equilibrium outcome. The intuition behind this notion is
that such an outcome is the best individually stable outcome that a central planner can
propose to selfish users.
The price of stability has been extensively analyzed in many network design scenar-
ios, where selfish users interact over a network, each trying to optimize some individual
objective [3,7,2,6]. However, prior to this work, all the literature on quantifying the
price of stability has considered only complete information models, where the users
know all the parameters of the game that they are playing, such as the location of all the
users in the network and the objective of each user.
The goal of this work is to relax this informational assumption, and understand
whether such optimistic efficiency results carry over to settings where players have in-
complete information about the game. Such settings are predominantly modeled via
Bayesian games [23], where instead of complete information, players have distribu-
tional beliefs about the parameters of the game and are maximizing their objective in
expectation over these beliefs. Such a unilaterally, stable in-expectation outcome is re-
ferred to as the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game. In this work we will analyze how
the expected quality of the best such Bayes-Nash equilibrium (in expectation over the
parameters of the game), compares to the expected optimal solution that a central plan-
ner who is aware of all the parameters of the game, could have implemented. We will
refer to the ratio of these two expected values as the Bayesian price of stability.
The prototypical scenario, where the price of stability analysis has been applied is
that of network design games: a set of self-interested network users want to build a set
of edges of a communication network to satisfy some connectivity constraint, such as
connect a source to some root (multi-cast) or connect a source node to a target node.
Each edge of the network has a building or usage cost, which is shared equally among
all users that have chosen to use the edge. Such a model applies to large communication
networks, where the built network corresponds to a virtual overlay or a multicast tree
on the Internet [25,14].
Incomplete information models are more suitable for such large scale communica-
tion networks, where the users are not aware of the location of all users in the network.
Moreover, running a pre-processing protocol to learn the location and objectives of all
users might be too costly and time-consuming, and even more importantly runs into
mis-reporting problems. Motivated by such concerns, we analyze the incomplete infor-
mation version of network design games, where the connectivity objective of each user
is private and drawn from some commonly known distribution. Such network design
games of incomplete information where already studied by Alon et al. [1], however
they did not analyze the question of whether price of stability guarantees persist in such
settings and their techniques can only lead to Bayesian price of stability upper bounds
that degrade with the size of the underlying graph, rather than the constant blow-ups we
show here, with respect to the complete information price of stability.
One of the engineering oriented motivations of analyzing the Bayesian price of sta-
bility in such network design games of incomplete information is similar to their com-
plete information counterparts: the designer of the network can propose a protocol that
consists of a set of “default” strategies for satisfying each connectivity objective over
the network. For instance, the protocol could provide default paths from each potential
source node to each potential target node or root. These paths are stable, or equivalently
constitute a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, only if for each player, using the default path, min-
imizes his cost among all possible paths, and in expectation over the location of other
users, assuming the rest of the users use the protocol. If the protocol doesn’t satisfy
this constraint then eventually self-interested individuals will start violating it, leading
to potentially large inefficiencies. Thus the quality of the best Bayes-Nash equilibrium,
corresponds to the best stable protocol that the network designer can devise.
In the complete information setting, [3] showed that although inefficiency of the
worst equilibrium outcome of such network deisgn games, can grow linearly with the
number of users, the social cost of the best equilibrium outcome is only an O(log(n))
blow-up to the minimum social cost, where n is the number of users. In other words, it
was shown that the price of stability is at mostO(log(n)). Our goal is to provide similar
guarantees for the Bayesian price of stability of these games.
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Our Contributions. Our main result is that theO(log(n)) bound on the price of stability
of most well-studied network design games, extends with only a constant degradation to
the incomplete information versions of the game. Specifically, we show that this holds
for multi-cast network design where each player wants to build a path to a global root
and for the undirected network design game where each player wants to build a path
from some user-specific source to some sink, as well as for several related versions
of covering games. For the case of multi-cast games the extension holds for the case
where each player’s source is distributed independently and asymmetrically over the
set of nodes of the network, while for the undirected network design game and for the
covering games it holds when the source-target pair of each user is distributed indepen-
dently and identically over the set of node pairs of the network.
Apart from the specific results on network design games, our work gives a frame-
work for proving Bayesian price of stability bounds for any incomplete information
game that admits a potential function: i.e. a global function that tracks the difference
in the cost of a user after any unilateral deviation. The main technique for providing
bounds on the price of stability for complete information potential games is what is
known as the potential method [3]: Every equilibrium of a potential game is a local
minimizer of the potential function. If the potential of the game is closely related to the
social cost, then the equilibrium that corresponds to the global minimizer of the poten-
tial function must achieve a social cost that is not much more than the optimal social
cost, i.e. minimizing the potential approximately minimizes the social cost.
Our approach on bounding the Bayesian price of stability is a black-box direct ex-
tension approach. Specifically, our goal is to claim that if the complete information ver-
sion of the game has a low price of stability via a potential method proof, then the same
bound extends with small degradation to the Bayesian price of stability. The hope that
such a black-box direct extension could be feasible is partially re-enforced by the fact
that a similar “extension theorem” approach has proven very successful for the price
of anarchy analysis [32,34], where it is shown that every price of anarchy bound for a
complete information game, proven via a canonical, smoothness proof [31], essentially
extends, without any degradation to incomplete information versions of the game.
We show that such a direct extension is sometimes also feasible for the analysis of
the Bayesian price of stability. Specifically, we show that when the price of stability of
the complete information game is bounded by some factor α, via the potential method,
then the Bayesian price of stability is upper bound by a factor α · β, where β is an
optimization, incentive-free, parameter of the game, that we refer to as the information
gap. The information gap asks what is the loss in efficiency caused solely by lack of
information and not by selfishness and was already analyzed by Alon et al. [1], mostly
providing negative results.
At a high level, using similar reasoning as in the complete information game, every
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game will correspond to a local minimizer
of some expected potential function. Hence, the expected social cost, when the players
use strategies that minimize the expected potential should be close to the strategy profile
that minimizes the expected social cost. However, a player’s strategy in the Bayesian
game is very constrained, as a player has information only about his private type. Hence,
even if the players’ goal is to minimize the social cost of the game, their information
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constraints disallow them to implement the ex-post social cost minimizing solution that
corresponds to each instantiation of player types. Comparing the expected social cost
achievable by strategies that use only private information, to the expected social cost of
a central planner that has access to all the information, is exactly captured in the notion
of the information gap.
The main technical challenge is then to show that the information gap is constant
for the network design games that we are interested in. We show that there is a strong
connection between the existence of approximation algorithms with strict cost sharing
schemes [20,19] and the information gap. Specifically, we show that if the complete in-
formation social cost minimization problem that is associated with the Bayesian game,
admits a constant-approximate algorithm with a strict cost-sharing scheme, then the in-
formation gap of the Bayesian game, when player’s types are distributed i.i.d. is also
a constant. Moreover, if the strict cost-sharing scheme is also cross-monotonic [22,29]
then the information gap bound extends to the non-i.i.d. setting. It is known that the
Steiner Forest and the Vertex Cover problem associated with the undirected network
design games and with the covering games admit a strict cost sharing scheme, while the
Steiner Tree problem which is associated with the multi-cast game admits a strict cost
sharing scheme that is also cross-monotone. Thus using our framework, these existing
cost-sharing results imply a constant bound on the information gap and subsequently a
constant degradation between the price of stability and the Bayesian price of stability.
Related Work. The price of stability was introduced by [3] and has since been applied
to many game theoretic models of networks [3,7,2,6] and in other contexts, such as in
discrete choice models of opinion [11]. However, as noted before, all the literature on
the price of stability assumes complete information models. A very interesting future
direction is applying our approach to other models where the price of stability has been
analyzed via the potential method, such as the discrete choice model of [11], where we
can analyze the case when the opinion of each player is private.
The complete information counterparts of the network design games that we ana-
lyze here, have been extensively studied from several perspectives. [9,10] analyze the
efficiency in multi-cast games where users arrive in an online manner and each user
connects greedily to the root, when he arrives. The online setting has a similar spirit
as our motivation in that users play in a manner that is unaware of opponent locations.
However, the approach is very different and in [9,10], it is assumed that players wont
take into account any distributional knowledge about their opponents. [13] analyze the
worst outcomes of the simultaneous network design game that are robust to coalitional
deviations (strong Nash equilibria) and show that their quality matches the O(log(n))
bound of the best Nash equilibria. [4], analyze best response dynamics in network de-
sign games, where the social planner proposes solutions that are followed by the players
with some small probability. It is an interesting future direction to analyze versions of
best-response dynamics that are natural under incomplete information. [28] analyzes a
special subclass of network design games and argues that when players arrive sequen-
tially, the worst subgame-perfect equilibrium of the sequential game also achieves the
O(log(n)) bound of the best Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game.
Games of incomplete information have been recently extensively studied from the
price of anarchy perspective, focusing mainly on models that capture auction scenar-
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ios: [12,5,24,15,8,35]. Similar to our direct extension approach on the price of stability,
[32] and [34], showed that a price of anarchy bound proven for the complete informa-
tion setting via the smoothness framework proposed in [31], directly extends with no
degradation to the incomplete information version of the game. However, network de-
sign games are not smooth. Moreover, their price of anarchy grows linearly with the
number of players as opposed to the price of stability.
Strict cost sharing schemes, which is our main technical tool for proving upper
bounds on the information gap, has played a quintessential role in designing simple
polynomial time constant-factor approximation algorithms for social cost minimization
problems associated with network design [20,19]. This algorithmic framework was in-
troduced in [20,19] and subsequently used by many papers to design improved approx-
imation algorithms for cost minimization games [16]. Moreover, several papers have
shown connection to stochastic versions of the algorithmic problem [21,22,18,17]. Our
result can be viewed as an analogue to this extension from deterministic to stochastic
versions of the problem, but for game-theoretic solution concepts and in fact our ap-
proach bears similarities to the approach of [17]. Cost-sharing schemes have also been
studied from a game theoretic perspective in mechanism design scenarios associated
with network games [29,26].
2 Bayesian Games and Quality of Best Bayes-Nash
Formally a Bayesian game of n players is defined as follows: Each player has a type ti
drawn from some prior probability distribution pii on some type space Ti. The distribu-
tions pii are independent and common knowledge and we denote with pi = pi1×. . .×pin.
Each player has a set of feasible actions Fi(ti) that depend on his type and which are
a subset of some universal action space Ai. We denote with A = A1 × . . . × An. The
cost of a player is a function Ci : A × Ti → R, mapping a feasible action profile and
his type to a cost. The strategy of a player is a function si : Ti → Ai, that takes as input
his type ti and outputs a feasible action ai ∈ Fi(ti). We will denote the space of these
Bayesian strategies with Si.
The standard solution concept in a Bayesian game is that of the Bayes-Nash equi-
librium (BNE), which is a profile of strategies s = (s1, . . . , sn), such that each player
is minimizing his cost in expectation over the types and actions of his opponents:
∀a′i ∈ Fi(ti) : Et−i [Ci(s(t) ; ti)] ≤ Et−i [Ci(a
′
i, s−i(t−i) ; ti)] (1)
We are interested in analyzing the expected social cost at equilibrium, which is
defined as the sum of the players’ expected costs:
K(s) = Et [
∑
i Ci(s(t) ; ti)] (2)
We want to compare this social cost with the expected optimal social cost that would
be achievable by a central coordinator who would observes the types of all players and
picks the optimal action profile for each realized set of types. For a type profile t let:
OPT(t) = argmina∈×iAi(ti)
∑
iCi(a ; ti) (3)
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We are interested in showing that there exists some Bayes-Nash equilibrium where the
expected social cost is at most constant times that of the expected optimal social cost.
This is formally captured by the Bayesian Price of Stability of the game, defined as:
BPoS = min
s is BNE
K(s)
Et[OPT(t)]
(4)
Bayesian Potential Games. We focus on the special case of a Bayesian game where the
type ti of each player only affects and determines his action space and not directly his
cost function. Thus there is a universal cost function ci : A → R+ that defines a cost
given any action profile a ∈ A such that: Ci(a ; ti) = ci(a) if a ∈ Fi(ti) and ∞ o.w..
We assume that the universal cost functions ci(a) admit a universal potential Φ :
A → R, i.e. for any action profile a ∈ A and for any a′i ∈ Ai: ci(a) − ci(a′i, a−i) =
Φ(a) − Φ(a′i, a−i). Moreover, we denote with C(a) =
∑
i ci(a) the universal social
cost for any action profile. We will refer to such a game as a Bayesian potential game.
We first observe that if we view the Bayesian game as a normal form game where
the strategy space of each player is Si and the cost function is Ki(s) = Et[ci(s(t))],
then it is a potential game with potential Ψ(s) = Et[Φ(s(t))].
Observation 1 The normal form game defined by a Bayesian potential game is a po-
tential game with potential Ψ(s) = Et[Φ(s(t))].
Moreover, a Nash equilibrium of this normal form game is a Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium of the Bayesian potential game. The latter then implies that the strategy profile s
that minimizes the potential function Ψ(s) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium:
Observation 2 The strategy profile s∗ = argmins Ψ(s) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of the Bayesian potential game.
Bayesian Potential Method and the Information Gap. We will focus on Bayesian po-
tential games, for which the potential method of bounding the price of stability (see
[3]) is applicable to their complete information versions. More formally, suppose that
the universal potential function Φ(a) is (λ, µ)-close to the universal social cost C(a) in
the sense that:
∀a ∈ A : λ · C(a) ≤ Φ(a) ≤ µ · C(a) (5)
then it was shown by [3] that the best Nash equilibrium of the complete information
potential game has social cost at most µ
λ
of the minimum social cost.
We provide an adaptation of this approach for Bayesian potential games. When
analyzing Bayesian games, there is an inherrent extra complication that is not present
in complete information games: playing the action profile that pointwise minimizes the
social cost for each instantiation of the type profile is not a feasible strategy of the
Bayesian game. The reason is that for the players to employ such an action they need
to know the type of their opponents, which is private information. Hence, this lack of
information does not allow the straightforward application of the potential method to
Bayesian games and requires us to analyze the following portion:
Definition 3 (Information Gap) Let s˜ = argmins∈S1×...×Sn K(s). Then the infor-
mation gap of a Bayesian game is: IG = K(s˜)
Et[OPT(t)] .
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The information gap is the ratio of the best social cost achievable by players via strate-
gies that use only their private information (and each player’s goal is to minimize social
cost rather than personal cost), over the expected optimal cost of a centralized coordi-
nator that computes the optimal action having access to the private type of every player.
Theorem 4 (Bayesian Potential Method). Consider a Bayesian potential game, where
the universal potential function Φ(·) is (λ, µ)-close to the universal social cost function
C(·). Then the BPoS is at most µ
λ
· IG
Proof. Consider the potential minimizing Bayes-Nash equilibrium s∗ and the social
cost minimizing strategy profile s˜. Then:
K(s∗) = Et [C(s∗(t))] ≤ Et[Φ(s
∗(t))]
λ
≤ Et[Φ(s˜(t))]
λ
≤ µK(s˜)
λ
≤ µIG
λ
Et [OPT(t)]
Bounding the information gap is the main technical challenge and the topic of the
remaining sections. We will focus on Bayesian versions of network design games [3],
which are Bayesian potential games where the universal potential is (1, log(n))-close
to the universal social cost. We show that in such games the information gap is constant.
3 Bayesian Network Design Games
Bayesian potential games include intuitive Bayesian versions of network design games.
We first give the general definition of a Bayesian network design game and then we give
subclasses that will be of interest in the paper.
Definition 5 (Bayesian Network Design Game) A Bayesian network design game is
characterized by a set of ground elements E and a set of players [n]. The type space
Ti is common for all players and is denoted with T , i.e. Ti = T for all i ∈ [n]. The
universal action space Ai is also common for all players and is simply the power set
of E, i.e. Ai = 2E . Conditional on her type, ti ∈ T , the action space of player i is a
collection of sets of ground elements Fi(ti) ⊆ 2E .Each element e ∈ E, is associated
with a non-negative cost ce, which can be thought as the cost of using element e. Given
an action profile a, we denote with ne(a), the congestion of element e, i.e. the number
of players whose action ai contains e. If many players use the same element, then they
equally share the building cost. The total cost of a player when she chooses a feasible
action ai ∈ Ai(ti), is the sum of his cost shares:ci(a) =
∑
e∈ai
ce
ne(a)
.
It is known that the complete information counterparts of these games, where the
type of each player is fixed and common knowledge, admit Rosenthal’s potential [30],
which would correspond to the universal potential of the Bayesian game under our
terminology: Φ(a) =
∑
e∈E
∑ne(a)
t=1
ce
t
. Therefore, a Bayesian network design game
is a Bayesian potential game. Moreover, as was shown in [3], Rosenthal’s potential is
(1, log(n))-close to the universal social cost, C(a) =
∑
e∈E:ne(a)≥1
ce.
Network design games become more meaningful when the set of ground elements
E corresponds to edges of a network, while the feasible action space of a player for
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a specific type A(ti), corresponds to a set of paths on the network connecting a set
of nodes. The type of each player is the connectivity constraint that the paths need to
satisfy. The following examples of network design games will be of main interest:
Example 1 (Bayesian multicast game with private sources). The set of ground elements
correspond to the edges of a metric graph G = (V,E), which has a designated root
node r ∈ V . Each player i is associated with a source si, which is her private type and
is drawn independently from a distribution pii over the set of terminals V . Each player
wants to connect his source to the root r. Thus the feasible actions Fi(si) of a player of
type si, is the set of paths from source si to the root r.
Example 2 (Bayesian undirected network design with private source-sink pairs). The
set of ground elements correspond to the edges of an undirected graph G = (V,E).
Each player i is associated with a node pair ti = (si, ri), of a source si ∈ V and a
sink ri ∈ V , which are her private type and which are drawn independently from a
distribution pii over the set of node pairs. Each player wants to connect her source to
her sink. Thus the feasible actions Fi(ti) is the set of paths from si to ri.
4 Bounding the Information Gap in Network Design Games
To bound the information gap of a Bayesian network design game, we need to find
a strategy profile s ∈ S1 × . . . × Sn of the Bayesian game, such that the expected
cost of the resulting strategy profile is close to the expected ex-post minimum social
cost. To address this problem we first analyze what is the equivalent ex-post social cost
minimization problem of the network design games that we defined in Section 3.
From Definition 5, the ex-post cost-minimization problem for each instance t of a
type profile asks for the set of ground elements S ⊆ E of minimum total building cost,
such that S is the union of feasible actions of the players for their type. We can modify
all the network design games in Section 3 such that if a set S of ground elements is a
feasible action for a player, then every superset of S, is also a feasible strategy (e.g. if
a path from s to r is a feasible strategy in the multicast game, then every superset of
a path is also a feasible strategy). At equilibrium, no player will ever use non-minimal
strategies and hence the two games are equivalent. Then the minimization problem asks
for a set S, such that there exists ai ∈ Fi(ti) with ai ⊆ S, which minimizes,
∑
e∈S ce.
For instance, the ex-post social cost minimization problem of the Bayesian multicast
game is the minimum cost Steiner Tree problem and of the undirected network design
game it is the Steiner Forest.
High level idea. We upper bound the information gap by constructing a strategy profile
of the Bayesian game as follows: prior to receiving their private types the players draw
a random sample of a type profile w ∈ T1× . . .×Tn from the prior distribution of types
pi. Then they build a solution for this random sample (e.g. build a spanning tree for some
random sample of sources). Then in the interim stage, after they receive their private
type ti, each of them independently and based only on her private type, augments the
solution constructed in the ex-ante stage to make it feasible for his realized private type
(e.g. routes to the nearest node of the steiner tree built in the first stage).
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The key property needed is that the solution of the first stage is constructed via some
approximation algorithm which admits cheap augmentation when new players arrive.
This is exactly captured by the existence of an algorithm that admits a strict cost sharing
scheme, a well-studied notion which we provide here for completeness.
Approximation algorithms with strict cost sharing schemes for sub-additive problems.
Consider the following setting: Let T be a universe of possible clients and E a set of
elements used to define a solution. For a set of clients U ⊆ T let Sol(U) ⊆ 2E be
the set of feasible solutions for U . The problem is sub-additive if for any U1, U2 ⊆ T ,
if E1 ∈ Sol(U1) and E2 ∈ Sol(U2), then E1 ∪ E2 ∈ Sol(U1 ∪ U2). The cost of a
solution F ⊆ E is C(F ) =
∑
e∈F c(e). Let OPT(U) ∈ Sol(U) be the cost minimizing
solution.
The connection to the cost-minimization problem arising from a network design
game is obvious. The universe of possible clients corresponds to the possible set of
types of the players in the game and a set of clients corresponds to a set of players
with a specific type profile, which we can also think as a set of types. A set of ground
elements F ⊆ E is feasible for a set of typed players, if for each player i, there exists
an action ai ∈ Fi(ti) with ai ⊆ F . Thus cost minimization is a sub-additive problem.
Let A : 2T → 2E , be an algorithm (not necessarily polynomial time for our
purposes) that given a set of clients U , it outputs an α-approximately optimal feasi-
ble solution: A(U). Moreover, let B(F, x) be an algorithm (not necessarily polyno-
mial time) that given a set of elements F ∈ Sol(U) that is a solution to a set of
clients U and a new client x ∈ T , returns a set of elements B(U, x) ⊆ E such that:
F ∪ B(U, x) ∈ Sol(U ∪ {x}).
Definition 6 ((α, β)-Strict Cost Sharing Scheme) An α-approximation algorithm A
and an augmentation algorithm B, admit a β-strict cost sharing scheme if there exists
a cost-sharing function ξ : 2T × T → R+, such that for any set of clients U ⊆ T and
for any client x ∈ T , ξ(U, x) satisfies the following properties:
– If x /∈ U then ξ(U, x) = 0
– Competitiveness:
∑
x∈U ξ(U, x) ≤ c(OPT(U))
– β-strictness with respect to (A,B): c(B(A(U), x)) ≤ β · ξ(U ∪ {x}, x).
Example 3 (Steiner Tree, α = 1 and β = 2). As an example, consider the Steiner-
Tree problem: an undirected metric graph G = (V,E), a root r and a set D ⊆ V of
clients. The problem asks for a Steiner-Tree onD∪{r}. The problem admits algorithms
A,B and a cost-sharing scheme that is 2-strict with respect to (A,B). Algorithm A is
simply the optimal (exponential) Steiner Tree algorithm. Consider the augmentation
algorithm that given a set D ⊆ V of clients and a new client x, it routes the client via
the shortest path to the optimal steiner tree on D ∪ {r}. Thus the cost of the algorithm
is c(B(A(U), x)) = d(OPT(D), x).
Consider the cost shares ξ(D, x) = 12d(D−{x}, x), for any x ∈ D and 0 otherwise.
The 2-strictness follows by: c(B(A(U), x)) = d(OPT(D), x) ≤ d(D, x) = 2 · ξ(D ∪
{x}, x). Also, observe that
∑
x∈D ξ(D, x) =
1
2
∑
x∈D d(D−{x}, x) ≤
1
2 ·MST (D),
since each client in the minimum spanning tree on node set D has a parent edge of cost
at least the minimum distance to the remaining nodes. Since MST on D is a two ap-
proximation to the optimal Steiner tree onD we get that
∑
x∈D ξ(D, x) ≤ c(OPT(D)).
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Strict cost sharing schemes and i.i.d. Bayesian network design games. We now argue
how strict cost sharing schemes imply a bound on the information gap of the game. In
this section we focus on the case where players’ types are distributed identically and
independently according to some distribution ρ on the type space T , i.e. pii = ρ.1
Theorem 7. If the ex-post cost-minimization problem associated with a Bayesian net-
work design game admits an α-approximation algorithmA and an augmentation algo-
rithm B with a cost-sharing scheme ξ which is β-strict with respect to (A,B), then the
information gap when types are drawn i.i.d. from some distribution ρ is at most β + α.
Proof. We construct a set of Bayesian strategies s = (s1, . . . , sn) as follows: we draw
a set D = {w1, . . . , wn} of random samples of n − 1 clients/types according to pi =
ρn. Then we compute a feasible solution A(D) on this random draw of clients using
algorithmA. Let R = {t1, . . . , tn} denote the set of true types/clients of the players. At
the interim stage (after viewing the true type), each player computes the augmentation
required to serve his true type, on top of A(D), using the augmentation algorithm B,
i.e. his strategy is s(ti) = A(D) ∪ B(A(D), ti). In fact, we can define si(ti) as the
cheapest subset of A(D) ∪ B(A(D), ti) that remains a feasible action. Observe that
each player uses only information available to him at the interim stage.
It remains to bound the expected cost of the final solution implied by the strategies
constructed by the above process (the process can also be derandomized). For any in-
stance of the real types R and fake types D, the cost of the algorithm is the cost of the
set: A(D) ∪ (∪i∈[n]B(A(D), ti)). The expected cost of A(D) is bounded by:
ED∼ρn−1 [c(A(D))] ≤ α · ED∼ρn−1 [c(OPT(D))] ≤ α · ER∼ρn [c(OPT(R))] ,
since optimal cost is monotone in the client set. It remains to bound the cost of the
augmentations, denoted by AUG, by β · ER∼pin [c(OPT(R))]. By symmetry:
AUG = n · Et∼ρ,D∼ρn−1 [c(B(A(D), t))] ≤ n · β · Et∼ρ,D∼ρn−1 [ξ(D ∪ {t}, t)]
Observe that the latter expectation is equivalent to the following portion: draw a random
sample of n clients according to ρn and then pick one client at random and account for
his cost-share when adding him to the rest of the client set.2 From this we get:
AUG ≤ n · β · Et∼ρ,D∼ρn−1 [ξ(D ∪ {t}, t)] = n · β · ER∼ρn
[
1
n
∑
t∈R ξ(R, t)
]
= β · ER∼ρn
[∑
t∈R ξ(R, t)
]
≤ β · ER∼ρn [c(OPT(R))],
where the last inequality follows from competitiveness of the strict cost shares.
Theorem 7 implies several results on the information gap for Bayesian games as-
sociated with many optimization problems. For instance, we saw in the previous sec-
tion that the Steiner Tree problem has a 1-approximation algorithm with a 2-strict cost
sharing scheme. Moreover, using the existence of strict cost-sharing schemes in the lit-
erature [21,19,17], we get the following bounds and the main theorem of this section:
1 Observe that the information gap depends on belief assumptions and not only on the structure
of the underlying complete information game.
2 This regrouping trick was also used in [17].
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Theorem 8. When types are i.i.d., the information gap for: i) Bayesian multicast game
is at most 3, ii) Bayesian undirected network design game is at most 5, iii) Bayesian
vertex cover game (App. A) is at most 6 (and 2(d+ 1) for d-hypergraph cover). Hence,
for all these games the BPoS is O(log(n)) when types are i.i.d..
Cross-monotonicity and non-i.i.d. Bayesian network design games. We also extend the
previous analysis to non-i.i.d. Bayesian games, if we impose the extra restriction on
the optimization problem, that the cost-shares are also cross-monotone, i.e. ξ(D, x) is
monotone non-increasing in D.
Theorem 9. If the ex-post cost-minimization problem associated with a Bayesian net-
work design game admits an α-approximation algorithm A and an augmentation al-
gorithm B with a cost-sharing scheme ξ which is β-strict with respect to (A,B) and
cross-monotonic, then the information gap of the corresponding Bayesian game when
each player’s type is drawn independently from some distribution pii, is at most β + α.
Proof. We slightly alter the process in the proof of Theorem 7 to take into account that
clients are not drawn identically. Intuitively, the algorithm draws a random sample of
ALGORITHM 1: Preprocessing, random-sampling algorithm for constructing strategies of
Bayesian game with non-identical distributions.
Let R = (t1, . . . , tn) be the input clients, which are drawn independently and identically
according to pi = (pi1, . . . , pin)
Draw a random sample of n clients D = (d1, . . . , dn) ∼ pi
Compute A(D)
Output: ∀i ∈ [n] : si(ti) = A(D) ∪ B(A(D), ti)
n clients according to the commonly known distribution of types. Then it computes a
feasible solution on this random draw of clients using algorithmA. Subsequently, each
player computes the augmentation required to serve his true type, on top of the ran-
domly sampled ones in the first stage. Then his strategy is s(ti) = A(D)∪B(A(D), ti),
which we know that it is in Sol({ti}) by the definition of the augmentation algorithm.
Similar to Theorem 7 it suffices to bound the expected cost of the final solution
implied by the strategies constructed by Algorithm 1, which is the expected cost of the
set of elements: A(D) ∪ (∪i∈[n]B(A(D), ti)).
First, observe that the expected cost of the solutionA(D) on the randomly sampled
clients D is at most:
ED∼pi [c(A(D))] ≤ α · ED∼pi [c(OPT(D))] = α · ER∼pi [c(OPT(R))] ,
Thus it remains to bound the cost of the augmentations by at most β·ER∼pi [c(OPT(R))].
The expected cost of augmenting input client i is:
AUGi =Eti∼pii,D∼pi [c(B(A(D), ti))] ≤ β · Eti∼pii,D∼pi [ξ(D ∪ {ti}, ti)]
11
By the cross-monotonicity of the cost shares:
AUGi ≤β · Eti∼pii,D∼pi [ξ(D−i ∪ {ti}, ti)] = β · Eti∼pii,D−i∼pi−i [ξ(D−i ∪ {ti}, ti)]
=β · Eti∼pii,R−i∼pi−i [ξ(R−i ∪ {ti}, ti)] = β · ER∼pi [ξ(R, ti)]
Using the competitiveness of the cost shares we can bound the total cost of the augmen-
tation by the desired quantity:
∑
i
AUGi ≤ β ·
∑
i
ER∼pi [ξ(R, x)] = β · ER∼pi
[∑
i
ξ(R, xi)
]
≤ β · ER∼pi [c(OPT(R))]
Thus we have established that the expected cost of the set of elements:A(D)∪(∪i∈[n]B(A(D), ti)),
is at most (β + α) · ER∼pi [c(OPT(R))].
By cross monotonicity of the strict cost-shares for the Steiner Tree problem, we get:
Theorem 10. When distributions of types are independent, the information gap for the
Bayesian multicast game is at most 3 and the Bayesian price of stability is O(log(n)).
An interesting case of the non-i.d.d. Bayesian multicast game is the independent
decisions model [21]: each node in the graph G is associated with a player i and this
player enters the game with some probability pi, or is not present with some probability
1 − pi. One can view this setting as a Bayesian multicast game among |V | players,
where the distribution pii of a player associated with a node i is a two point distribution
that puts a probability p on the node associated with player i and probability 1 − p on
the root r.
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A Vertex Cover Games
Consider the following setting: there is a set of nodes v ∈ V , each associated with
a cost cv. Each player i ∈ [n], is associated with an edge (u, v) ∈ V × V , which
represents the pair of nodes that can satisfy (coiver) player i’s needs. This edge is the
private information of player i and is drawn from some distribution pii on the set of
node pairs. The action of a player i with type ti = (u, v) ∈ V × V , is to choose one
of the two nodes u and v. If many players pick the same node then they share equally
the cost of the node. This game can also be cast as a Bayesian Network Design Game
where the ground set of elements E is equal to the set of nodes V and the action set of
a player with type ti = (u, v) is the collection of singletons {{u}, {v}}.
d-Hypergraph Cover More generally, we can also consider the generalization of the
above game where each player is not associated with an edge (u, v), but rather with a
hyperedge h ⊆ V of size d, which is his private type and is drawn from some distribu-
tion pii on the set of hyperedges on V . Then the set of feasible actions of a player with
type h, is to choose one node in his hyperedge. Intuitively, the nodes in the hyperedge
are the nodes that can ”satisfy” player i. By similar analogy, the above setting is also a
Bayesian Network Design Game.
B Omitted Proofs
Proof of Observation 1 : Consider a strategy profile s of the Bayesian Potential Game
and a strategy s′i for player i. Then:
Ki(s)−Ki(s
′
i, s−i) = Et [Ci(s(t)) − Ci(s
′
i(ti), s−i(t−i))]
= Et [ci(s(t))− ci(s′i(ti), s−i(t−i))]
= Et [Φ(s(t)) − Φ(s′i(ti), s−i(t−i))] = Ψ(s)− Ψ(s
′
i, s−i)
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